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Introduction
We previously proposed a class of statistical attacks that exploit flow-level timing signatures [5] . These socalled flow correlation attacks can seriously degrade flow-based anonymity communication systems in particular if they carry TCP flows. The idea underlying the flow correlation attack is: Assuming an adversary intercepts a sample of Alice's flow going through a mix and samples of the mix's output aggregate flows, the adversary can determine the output link for Alice's flow by comparing the dependence between Alice's flow sample to the aggregate flow samples. We use mutual information to measure the dependence. The intuition of flow correlation attacks is: The mix network transforms the Alice's flow through different mixing strategies, but the actual outgoing link for Alice's flow will be dependent on Alice's flow while Alice's flow is independent of the other outgoing links. We use detection rate [5] , the probability of identifying the actual outgoing link, as a metrics to evaluate the performance of mixes under flow correlation attacks. Experiments have shown [5] that flow correlation attacks are effective even with large amounts of cross traffic.
In this paper, we formally model the effectiveness of flow correlation attacks. Our formulae clearly show the relationship between detection rate and the amount of available data for a mix network. Our results are applicable to mix networks of any size and topology and mix networks using any batching strategies. They are also applicable to any type of traffic. As expected, mix networks will ultimately fail when an adversary has access to sufficiently long flow samples. Our analytical framework can be used to analyze any mixing strategies [3] under flow correlation attacks. Specially, we show how to use a combination of M/M/∞ and M/D/1 queuing models to model the continuous-time mix, in which packets are randomly delayed. We will show that the detection rate for Poisson traffic models is a lower bound for TCP traffic, which is dominant in the Internet. We believe that our analysis based on queuing models can provide a useful guideline for designers to develop and deploy anonymity systems, as (a) it can be used in a similar way for a variety of statistical traffic analysis attacks, and (b) it is applicable to a variety of mixes.
Models
Flow-based Mix Network Model: A flow-based mix is a relay server for the packets of anonymous flows. A mix operates as follows: (1) the sender attaches the receiver address to a packet and encrypts the entire packet with the mix's public key; (2) the mix collects a batch of packets (from different senders), and decrypts each of them separately to obtain the receiver addresses; (3) finally the mix sends the decrypted packets out in a rearranged order to the various receivers. Batching and reordering are necessary techniques for a mix to prevent traffic analysis attacks, which may correlate input packets and output packets by their timing.
In this paper, we investigate the anonymity of flowbased anonymity systems that use the continuous-time mixes. In a continuous-time mix [1, 2] , each packet into the mix is assigned a delay (deadline) that satisfies some given distribution. The packet is sent out when its deadline is reached. Danezis [1] proves that in terms of an entropy-based anonymity metric, the packet delay should satisfy an exponential distribution, which is also the setting used in this work. Threat Model: In the following, we summarize the adversarial assumptions considered in this paper: (a) The content of communication between legal participants is protected by underlying encryption algorithms and is not accessible to attacks. These assumptions are widely used in open environments to evaluate anonymity systems aimed at achieving strong anonymity.
Flow Correlation Attacks
We formalize the flow correlation attack [5] as follows:
1. Capture the timing data of the flows: The adversary captures samples of Alice's flow and the aggregate flows on each possible outgoing link. Each sample (of length t) is divided into segments of equal length, based on time. The length of each segment is denoted as the sampling interval, and t is the sample length. In our paper, we use a sampling interval of 10ms which captures the transmission dynamics of TCP accurately, especially for TCP flows. The optimal sampling interval selection and proof can be found in [6] . The number of packets in each segment is counted and forms a time series of packet counts for the flow sample.
Each time series has a size of N , denoted as sample size. We have a set of M possible outgoing links. We 
In the following, we usep to denote frequency, while p denotes the actual underlying distribution. Similarly in the rest of paper, we useÎ to denote mutual information estimation based on the frequencyp as in (1) and I to denote the actual mutual information, which is based on the actual underlying distribution p. 3. Decide on the receiver: To decide the outgoing link of Alice's flow, the adversary chooses the one whose aggregate flow sample time series has the biggest mutual information with Alice's flow sample time series. That is, ifÎ(X,
Alice's flow goes through the i th link. In the following section, we build an analytical framework to analyze (a) why flow correlation attacks succeed and (b) the system parameters' impact on the performance of flow correlation attacks. The framework of anonymity analysis in this paper can be easily extended to other mixing strategies in [3] although we focus on continuous-time mixes with exponentially distributed packet delay.
Modeling Flow Correlation Attacks
Detection Rate as Anonymity Degree In this paper, we measure the anonymity degree in form of detection rate, which is defined as the probability that the adversary correctly recognizes the actual outgoing link.
Without loss of generality, we denote the packet count on the correct outgoing link as Y 1 and packet counts on the other links as Y 2 , · · · , Y M . We also denote the mutual information between X and Y 1 asÎ 1 , and the mutual information between X and the other packet counts aŝ I 2 , · · · ,Î M . The detection rate D can be calculated as follows:
Distribution of Mutual Information Estimation Flow correlation attacks rely on establishing statistical properties of traffic based on collected data. The effectiveness of such attacks therefore depends directly on the accuracy of the attackers' estimation techniques. For the flow correlation attack described above, we must assess the accuracy of the attacker's estimation of the mutual information. In this section, we prove a few characteristics about estimation of mutual information. This will be of use in the following sections. According to Central Limit Theorem, when the sample size N is sufficiently large, mutual information estimation satisfies a normal distribution. So to obtain the distribution function, we only need to estimate normal distribution estimation's mean and variance, which are given in Lemma 1 and 2, respectively. Please refer [4] for proof. 
where p(u, v j ) is the original probability distribution of (X, Y j ). Detection Rate Theorem Based on the characteristics of the mutual information estimation determined above, we can calculate the detection rate using the following Theorem 1. The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in [4] . N (0, 1) is the density function of the standard normal distribution, and C 1 is a constant defined in (4) .
Theorem 1 For a mix with any number of output links, the detection rate, D, is given by
Two observations are in place regarding Theorem 1: First, formula (5) is applicable to a mix using any mix strategy (simple proxy without any batching and reordering, timed mix, continuous-time mix and others [3] ) and accommodates any input flow types. This demonstrates the generality of Theorem 1. Second, the detection rate is an increasing function of the sample size N . This is consistent with common sense: any mix network will fail to maintain anonymity if the adversary is allowed to make an arbitrarily long observation. Joint Distribution of (X, Y i ) for a Continuous Mix The formulation of (5) in Theorem 1 is generic in terms of traffic and mix characteristics. However, both the constants C i and the original mutual information I i depend on the joint distribution function p(u, v i ), which in turn depends on the traffic and the mix characteristics.
It has been shown earlier [1] that a continuous mix can be easily modeled as a two queue model shown in Figure  1 , for the case of Poisson traffic. While it is generally agree upon that Poisson is a poor model for Internet traffic, it is adequate in our case, since we are interested in worst-case detectability of TCP flows. As illustrated in Figure 3 , Poisson traffic is harder to detect, and therefore gives an safe lower bound on the detection rate.
The first queue of the continuous-time mix represents the packet delay module, while the second queue represents the fixed capacity output link of the mix. Since packets are delayed according to an exponential distribution, the delay module can be modeled as a M/M/∞ queue. The output traffic of this queue is still a Poisson process, and, since packets in a mix network are typically padded to a fixed size, the output link queue can be modeled as M/D/1 queue.
Based on this model of a continuous-time mix, it is straightforward to derive the joint distribution of (X, Y i ) if we can model the incoming traffic into the mix. Detailed steps can be found in [4] .
Performance Evaluation
The evaluation of our work consists of three steps: first, we illustrate the validity of our theory through an experimental comparison of detection rates of Poisson vs. TCP traffic. Then we show results of ns-2 based simulations that illustrate the accuracy of our continuous-time mix model. Finally, we discuss the effects of the delay parameters of the continuous mix on the mix's effectiveness.
Network Setup in a Testbed
The experimental testbed and simulation network setup is shown in Figure 2 . Alice sends traffic to Bob, while senders S 2 and S 3 send noise traffic to both Bob and R 2 . We assume that the adversary is interested in finding out whether Bob is the receiver of Alice's traffic. 
Figure 2. Experiment Setup
Since more complicated cases just require more comparisons, this setup is sufficient for us to demonstrate the accuracy of our model.
Failure of the Continuous-time Mix
Experimental Results We first show the failure of the continuous-time mix by experiments. We implemented the continuous-time mix on the Timesys/RealTime Linux operating system. The mix control module that performs the delay function is integrated into the Linux firewall system using Netfilter. The bandwidth of all links is 10M b/s. The average delay of the continuous-time mix in this subsection is 20ms.
We consider two cases here: (1) All the traffic is TCP. TTCP is used to generate TCP traffic. There are five TCP flows to Receiver Bob and R 2 respectively. One of the flow to Bob is from Alice; (2) All the traffic is Poisson (using UDP). The rate of traffic to Bob and to R 2 is around 650 packets/s and the rate of traffic from Alice to Bob is around 200 packets/s. Figure 3 . We make three observations.
For the continuous-time mix, flow correlation attacks can achieve high detection rates given access to sufficient data. Detection rates increase with the amount of data available. This result and previous experimental results in [5] empirically give evidence for the correctness of our detection rate formula (5) .
Experiments with TCP flows show much higher detection rates than experiments with UDP traffic. The reason for this is that TCP's feedback congestion control mechanism causes Alice's flow to have a stronger timing signature in comparison with the Poisson traffic. This signature is observable both at the input and the output of the mix. It is therefore easier to correlate Alice's flow with aggregates at the output links. Thus it is easier to detect than Poisson traffic.
Flow correlation attacks can be very efficient. Recall that we use a sampling interval of 10ms. Thus, a sample size of 3000 corresponds to a sample length of 30 seconds. Given access to 30 seconds of data, an attacker can achieve a detection rate of 100% in the case of TCP traffic and a detection rate of around 90% for Poisson traffic even with a high load of noise traffic. 
Modeling Accuracy by Simulation:
We use the ns-2 simulator to evaluate the accuracy of the model described in Section 4. We consider two cases of traffic load: light traffic load and heavy traffic load. We distinguish the two cases to assess the accuracy of the M/D/1-based model for the output port, as in the case of light traffic load, the second queue can be largely ignored.
In the experiments, we vary the link capacity instead of the traffic load, with a 1Tb/s and 5Mb/s capacity for the light and heavy load respectively. The traffic of Alice's flow is Poisson with an average rate of 100 packet/s. The noise traffic to Receiver Bob and R 2 are also Poisson with average rates 400 and 500 packet/s respectively. The link delay between the mix and the receivers is 50ms. The links between senders and mix have 100Mb/s bandwidth and 1ms delay. The continuous-time mix's average delay is set to 20ms. Figure 4 compares the results obtained from our model and by simulation. We make two observations:
The results from the model well match the simulation results. For example, the mean estimation error is only around 5% and the estimation error never exceeds 15%.
The detection rate is higher in the case of light traffic load. The reason is: in the case of heavy traffic load, the aggregate traffic rate is comparable to the link bandwidth. The output queue will therefore shape and so further perturb the outgoing traffic. This reduces the dependence between the sender's outbound flow and the receiver's inbound flow. Nevertheless, this effect is accurately captured by the M/D/1 queue model in this paper.
Impact of Continuous Mix Parameter
WDYJV 'HWHFWLRQ 5DWH Figure 5 . Impact of Average Mix Delay Parameter t avg The continuous-time mix with exponentially distributed delay has a single parameter: the average delay t avg . Figure (5) shows the relationship between the detection rate and the average delay for sample size 60, 480, 3840, and 30720. The sampling interval is set to 10ms. These sample size correspond to sample length of 0.6s, 4.8s, 38.4s and 307.2s. We make two observations: Detection rate decreases as t avg increases for each case of sample size. This is to be expected: because when t avg increases, the probability for a packet held in the delay module or an incoming packet to leave the mix in the same sample interval will decrease. In turn, this will cause a smaller dependence between the flow of interest and the aggregate traffic containing the flow.
Detection rate increases as the sample size increases when we fix t avg . This is consistent with the results in Figure 4 . Again, it is because the increase of the amount of data for detection will cause more accurate estimation of dependency between the flow of interest and the aggregate traffic flows.
Conclusion
In this paper we formally model flow correlation attacks, which may severely degrade anonymous communication systems. Specially, we use queuing models to analyze the performance of a continuous-time mix, which randomly assign a deadline to each incoming packet. we show the accuracy of our model and its use for designers to develop and deploy anonymity systems.
